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MICROECONOMICS MADE (TOO) EASY: A 
CASEBOOK APPROACH TO TEACHING 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 
Gregory S. Crespi* 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS. By David w. 
Barnes and Lynn A. Stout. St. Paul: West Publishing Company. 
1992. Pp. xxix, 538. $38.95. 
The economic approach to law has become a respectable mode of 
legal analysis. 1 Legal educators should encourage those students with 
the necessary background and abilities to develop some facility in ap-
plying microeconomic principles to legal questions. Most of the "bet-
ter" law schools now offer at least one upper-level elective course, 
usually taught by a law professor with a substantial background in 
economics (often a Ph.D. degree), that reviews the basic concepts of 
price theory and efficiency analysis and then applies those concepts to 
the core doctrines of property, contract, and tort law. 
The greatest difficulty that a teacher faces in offering such a course 
is selecting course materials. One can provide students with a set of 
articles, book excerpts, cases, and other handouts individually selected 
to develop the themes that one wishes to emphasize. The effort in-
volved in such a painstaking assembly, however, is considerable, and 
one labors with the nagging suspicion that one is perhaps reinventing 
the wheel. Since "law-and-economics" courses have been standard of-
ferings at the elite law schools from at least the early 1970s, and have 
diffused rapidly thereafter into the lower-tier schools, one would ex-
pect a treatise to be available that could serve adequately as a core 
course text, requiring only modest supplementation to reflect a 
teacher's particular perspective and choice of topics. Somewhat 
• Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.S. 1969, Michigan State 
University; M.S. 1974, George Washington University; Ph.D. 1978, University of Iowa; J.D. 
1985, Yale. -Ed. 
1. THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1992·93 (1992) lists 118 law professors who 
upon occasion teach law·and-economics courses, and it notes that 71 of those professors are 
currently teaching the subject. See id. at 108-09. This information likely understates both the 
number of professors qualified to teach the subject and the number of courses offered. For exam-
ple, the directory does not list Guido Calabresi, Henry Hansmann, and George Priest of Yale, all 
noted scholars in the field, and it lists only one person from Harvard Law School, which also 
houses a number of prominent law-and-economics scholars. In addition, this registry omits the 
smaller but still significant number of law-and-economics seminars that economics departments 
offer to their undergraduate majors and graduate students. 
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surprisingly, none of the available books has all of the qualities neces-
sary to fill that role. 
David W. Bames2 and Lynn A. Stout3 have attempted to meet this 
clear need with their new publication Cases and Materials on Law and 
Economics4 (hereinafter Cases and Materials). In my opinion, their 
effort is unsuccessful. While the book compares favorably in some re-
gards to earlier attempts, it exhibits significant and pervasive short-
comings that will probably prevent it from being widely adopted. 
Economics is the science of rational choice under constraints; the 
study of maximizing behavior when tradeoffs must be made. Cases 
and Materials should thus be evaluated not against some abstract stan-
dard of perfection, but instead by the more appropriate (and forgiving) 
benchmark of the best available alternatives. In this review I will first 
briefly describe and criticize the four most serviceable texts available 
to teachers of law-and-economics courses prior to the publication of 
Cases and Materials. Then, I will outline the structure and content of 
Cases and Materials and compare it to those earlier works. I will con-
clude by offering a few comments concerning the institutional and 
other problems that are retarding the development of suitable texts for 
law-and-economics courses. 
I. THE COMPETITORS 
Prior to the publication of Cases and Materials, four legitimate 
candidates were available as core texts for law school courses designed 
to review basic microeconomic principles and apply those concepts to 
analyze the efficiency and other characteristics of legal rules: Richard 
A. Posner's Economic Analysis of Law,· 5 A. Mitchell Polinsky's An In-
troduction to Law and Economics; 6 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen's 
Law and Economics,· 7 and Robin P. Malloy's Law and Economics: A 
Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice. 8 
2. Professor of Law, University of Denver. 
3. Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University. 
4. Barnes and Stout have also published the accompanying supplementary volume 
TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND EcONOMICS 
(1992). 
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992). 
6. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS (2d ed. 1989). 
7. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMICS (1988). 
8. ROBIN P. MALLOY, LAW AND EcONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY 
AND PRACTICE (1990). Two additional treatises written by Americans appear less well suited to 
serve as core texts than the books discussed herein. WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LA w AND EcONOM-
ICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (1979) is similar in its style and approach to the Posner text 
but is not nearly as comprehensive. CHARLES J. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND 
EcoNOMICS (1984), which presents a rather idiosyncratic selection of topics in an unusual se-
quence, would be highly inconvenient to use as a core text in a traditional law-and-economics 
course. 
British writers have prepared several treatises and essay collections. Because of either their 
selective focus or their style of discourse, however, these books all seem poorly suited for use as 
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Richard Posner's seminal book, now in its fourth edition, was the 
first work comprehensively to apply economic principles to a wide 
range of legal questions,9 and it has received considerable critical at-
tention.10 Its great strength is its very broad range of topics: Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law insightfully and provocatively applies price 
theory not only to property, contract, and tort law, but also to crimi-
nal law, family law, administrative law, corporate and financial regula-
tion, constitutional law, civil and criminal procedure, and a number of 
other areas. While incredibly broad in scope, however, it is exceed-
ingly narrow in its unqualified endorsement and relentless application 
of the Kaldor-Hicks wealth-maximization normative efficiency crite-
rion.11 Posner barely pauses to acknowledge the rather persuasive 
criticisms of that criterion, 12 let alone to develop the implications of 
assessing legal rules by other standards. Posner also marshals little, if 
any, empirical support for his strong policy positions, and he generally 
relies upon hypotheticals to make his points rather than applying eco-
nomic principles to actual cases. Moreover, while Posner declares in 
the preface to the latest edition that "no prior acquaintance with eco-
nomics on the part of the reader is assumed," 13 the book is extremely 
heavy going for a law student who has not taken a solid introductory 
microeconomics course and had some exposure to intermediate price 
theory and efficiency analysis. 
If one is a devotee of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion and is 
teaching a class of law students who all have relatively strong econom-
ics backgrounds, then Economic Analysis of Law may be a suitable 
text. If, however, one confronts the usual cross-section of law students 
core texts for American law school courses. See THE EcONOMIC APPROACH TO LA w (Paul 
Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds., 1981); J.M. OLIVER, LAW AND EcONOMICS: AN INTRO· 
DUCTION (1979); FRANK H. STEPHEN, THE EcONOMICS OF THE LAW (1988); CENTO G. VEUA· 
NOVSKI, THE EcONOMICS OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTORY TEXT (1990). 
9. The first edition of Economic Analysis of Law appeared in 1972. 
10. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 3 (1975); Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 
VA. L. REV. 451 (1974); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Prod· 
uct: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655 (1974); 
Patrick W. Brennan, Economic Analysis of Law. 3d Ed., 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1159 (1987) (book 
review); John J. Donohue III & Ian Ayers, Posner's Symphony No. 3: Thinking About the Un-
thinkable, 39 STAN. L. REv. 791 (1987) (book review). 
11. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion endorses any policy for which the aggregate benefits exceed 
the aggregate costs, with benefits and costs measured by the willingness to pay evidenced by the 
affected persons. This criterion is consequently insensitive to the distribution of costs and bene· 
fits across the affected population. POSNER, supra note 5, at 13-16. For an insightful and highly 
entertaining critique of its embrace of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and other aspects of Posner's 
book, see Leff, supra note 10. No one should read Economic Analysis of Law without also read· 
ing Leif's review. 
12. See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); 
Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 
(1980). 
13. POSNER, supra note 5, at xix. 
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that enrolls in a law-and-economics course - the majority of whom 
have only taken a single year of introductory economics at least two or 
three years before, and a few of whom have no prior economics back-
ground - and wishes to develop in these students not only an ability 
to engage in efficiency analysis but also a critical understanding of the 
wealth-maximization criterion, informed by utilitarian, Kantian, 
Christian, Marxist, racial, feminist, nihilist, and perhaps other per-
spectives, Posner's book is unsuitable as a core text. Just to equip the 
students with the microeconomic concepts and philosophical perspec-
tives necessary to read Economic Analysis of Law and to take it with 
the appropriate shaker of salt would take virtually the entire semester; 
insufficient time would remain to apply these concepts to substantive 
legal questions. 
An Introduction to Law and Economics, by Mitchell Polinsky, dif-
fers greatly in approach from Posner's effort. It is short (about one 
quarter the length of Economic Analysis of Law), lucid, and well writ-
ten.14 Polinsky's book also suggests that the reader need not possess 
prior knowledge of economics, but unlike Economic Analysis of Law 
the book lives up to this claim. Polinsky builds his work around a 
concise explication of the Coase Theorem, which he then applies to 
increasingly sophisticated hypothetical contract and tort contexts. He 
keeps the economics terminology to a minimum and limits the mathe-
matics to relatively simple numerical examples. No case analysis is 
provided. Polinsky's avowed goal is to convey the spirit and flavor of 
the economic approach to law rather than to provide a comprehensive 
survey of its applications.15 The book is quite successful in achieving 
this objective. · 
Good as it is, however, An Introduction to Law and Economics is 
unsuitable as a comprehensive core text for a law-and-economics 
course for at least three reasons, all deriving from the book's limited 
objective and scope of coverage. First, while it may well serve to moti-
vate a law student with little or no economics background to learn 
microeconomics, it will not teach that student microeconomics. If 
used in a law-and-economics course enrolling the usual diverse group 
of law students the book requires substantial supplementation with 
technical microeconomics material. Second, if one wishes to move be-
yond the most basic common law doctrines in applying the efficiency 
paradigm, or to examine any actual cases, topical supplementation is 
required. Third, while Polinsky avoids Posner's "in your face" stance 
with regard to the importance of wealth maximization and expressly 
14. For a number of insightful and favorable reviews of Polinsky's book, see B. Beavis, A.M. 
Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics, 4 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 96 (1984); Judith A. 
Lachman, Knowing and Showing Economics and Law, 93 YALE L.J. 1587 (1984); John E. Noyes, 
An Introduction to Law and Economics, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 410 (1984); Stewart Schwab, A. 
Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics, 35 J. LEGAL Eouc. 142 (1985). 
15. POLINSKY, supra note 6, at xiii. 
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recognizes the tensions between Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and various 
equitable considerations, the limited attention he devotes to this im-
portant question necessitates substantial supplementation if students 
are to develop a critical understanding of the normative pivot of con-
ventional law-and-economics thinking. 
Because of this need for considerable supplementation, An Intro-
duction to Law and Economics leaves the core text problem unsolved. 
As a small piece of a "homemade" course drawing upon many other 
sources, however, it serves well. I have found it a very useful book for 
students to read lightly prior to commencing the course. It has proved 
particularly helpful to students with no prior economics background; 
the book gave some of them a basic appreciation of economic model-
ing and deductive reasoning that helped them make great early strides 
and (to be candid) efficiently demonstrated to others that their eco-
nomics and analytical skills were unfortunately so deficient that they 
should enroll in a different course. I have also found quite useful cer-
tain of its substantive chapters, particularly the excellent materials on 
risk-bearing and insurance and on activity-level issues in tort law. Po-
linsky's book is too narrow, however, to serve as the core course text. 
Unlike either Posner or Polinsky, Robert Cooter and Thomas 
Ulen, in Law and Economics, provide the reader with a comprehensive 
and systematic discussion of basic microeconomic theory. 16 While 
their discussion serves as an excellent review for someone already fa-
miliar with microeconomics, its theoretical sophistication may over-
whelm a student with little or no prior economics background. Cooter 
and Ulen cover a fairly broad range of legal issues, though not as 
many as Posner's book. The book also includes a chapter that in-
troduces law and legal institutions, although in a fashion too simplistic 
to be of much benefit to upper-level law students. 
Cooter and Ulen have designed a text primarily for upper-level un-
dergraduate or graduate students majoring in economics who wish to 
learn to apply economic reasoning to legal issues and who have little 
or no prior legal background. 17 For law students who were under-
graduate economics majors or have graduate degrees in economics or 
a related field, Law and Economics would serve fairly well as a core 
text. For the more typical law student who is struggling to recall the 
rudiments of her long-ago microeconomics principles course, the level 
of economic analysis is too sophisticated. Moreover, Cooter and 
Ulen's book suffers from the same serious failing that characterizes 
Posner's and Polinsky's efforts, as well as law-and-economics scholar-
16. Cooter and Ulen cover such topics as maximization, equilibrium, efficiency, the theory of 
consumer choice and demand curves, supply curves and market structure analysis, game theory, 
welfare economics, and the basic mathematical and graphical tools by which such concepts are 
given rigor. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 15-54. 
17. For a review of Cooter and Ulen's book, see John P. Speir, Law and Economics, 34 
ANTITRUST BULL. 951 (1989). 
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ship generally: it gives unduly short shrift to normative considerations 
other than efficiency, and it incorrectly implies that efficiency consid-
erations should necessarily be given a major role in resolving legal 
disputes. 18 
The recent short book by Robin Malloy, Law and Economics: A 
Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice, takes an innovative ap-
proach to teaching students how to apply economic concepts to legal 
analysis. 19 Malloy calls for a move away from the preoccupation with 
price theory and efficiency criteria that characterize most economic 
analyses of law to accord at least equal consideration to other analytic 
approaches and evaluative criteria more favorable to the interests of 
the economically disadvantaged.20 The book begins by drawing a dis-
tinction between the economic analysis of law - the conventional ap-
plication of price theory to legal issues - and a broader, more 
philosophical and comparative inquiry meriting the name law and eco-
nomics. 21 It subsequently provides a brief, but quite lucid, introduc-
tion to basic supply-and-demand theory, and then moves on to 
introduce succinctly more sophisticated concepts such as the Coase 
Theorem, Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and the Arrow Impos-
sibility Theorem. Malloy then turns to his main objective, making 
clear the central role of ideological presuppositions in economic and 
legal theory, by laying out in general terms the contrasting features of 
the conservative, liberal, left-communitarian, neo-Marxist, libertarian, 
and classical liberal approaches to economic theory. Several common 
law applications emphasize the sensitivity of the conclusions reached 
to one's choice of ideological starting point. A Comparative Approach 
is enjoyable reading, if you favor a broad, critical approach to social 
theory, and students with little or no economics background can un-
derstand its arguments. The work's apparent aim, however, is to re-
veal the limitations of neoclassical price theory, not to teach it. It 
consequently serves poorly as a text for a teacher who seeks to enable 
students to conduct sophisticated efficiency analyses as well as make 
them aware of the ideological presuppositions and limitations of the 
efficiency paradigm. A teacher who intends to structure a law-and-
economics course for law students along conventional lines is well ad-
vised to supplement his core text with Malloy's book, as well as with 
other materials critical of the wealth-maximization criterion that are 
18. For a more comprehensive discussion of this problem, as well as a discussion of the 
theoretical problems resulting from the nonfalsifiability of the rationality postulate, see Gregory 
S. Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the Problems of 
Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 (1991). 
19. For insightful and favorable reviews ofMalloy's book, see Paul H. Brietzke, A Law and 
Economics Praxis, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 51 (1990); Robert A. Weninger, Law and Economics: A 
Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 187 (1992). 
20. MALLOY, supra note 8, at 48-56. 
21. Id. at 2-3. 
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grounded in utilitarian or Kantian perspectives. One would be doing 
one's students a disservice, however, if one relied upon Malloy's book 
as the core text rather than using it in a gadfly role. 
The Posner, Polinsky, Cooter and Ulen, and Malloy alternatives 
that were available prior to the publication of Cases and Materials all 
have their strengths, but as discussed above each also has serious 
weaknesses that lessen its attractiveness as a core text. Their problems 
are sufficiently severe to make it advisable for professors to compile 
selected articles and other readings rather than using a single text. I 
now examine whether Cases and Materials advances sufficiently be-
yond these other works to merit its widespread adoption. 
II. THE CASEBOOK APPROACH 
The authors of Cases and Materials have attempted to provide a 
textbook suitable for teaching law students with no prior economics 
background how to engage in the economic analysis of legal issues (p. 
vi); to achieve this end, Barnes and Stout utilize the pedagogical for-
mat of a casebook rather than a theory-oriented treatise (p. v). They 
have gone much too far, however, in attempting to address law stu-
dents in the students' own vernacular. The resulting product is an 
awkward work that is inadequate as a core text for a law-and-econom-
ics course. 
Cases and Materials is of moderate length - slightly over 500 
pages in the standard West treatise format - and is divided into seven 
chapters. Chapter One briefly introduces the concepts of rationality, 
scarcity, utility maximization, wealth maximization, and allocative ef-
ficiency. Chapter Two applies economic principles to basic questions 
of property and nuisance law; it introduces the Coase Theorem and 
the concepts of transaction costs and externalities. Chapter Three ex-
amines the economic incentives provided by tort law, compares vari-
ous negligence and strict liability regimes, and investigates damages 
issues. Chapter Four discusses the economics of contract law, focus-
ing primarily on the question of remedies. Chapter Five examines the 
efficiency of the common law. Chapter Six presents basic 
microeconomic concepts of supply, demand, and marginal analysis 
and applies them to issues of regulation and antitrust policy. Chapter 
Seven applies economic and public choice theory to analyze questions 
of constitutional law and the design of political institutions. 
This range and sequencing of topics is fairly conventional and par-
allels the overall design of the Posner, Polinsky, Cooter and Ulen, and 
Malloy texts. The topical format of Cases and Materials does have 
several distinctive features. First, the review of basic market theory is 
deferred until the next-to-the-last chapter of the book.22 Second, an 
22. Pp. 311-408. In contrast, Posner discusses "The Nature of Economic Reasoning" in his 
opening chapter, see POSNER, supra note S, at 3-19, Polinsky talks about the role of assumptions 
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entire chapter is devoted to discussion of the common law efficiency 
hypothesis.23 Finally, the last chapter emphasizes the application of 
economic theory and public choice analysis to questions of constitu-
tional law and political structure. 24 
The most distinctive aspect of Cases and Materials, however, is its 
unwavering commitment to a casebook format. The authors rely al-
most exclusively upon case excerpts followed by author notes rather 
than upon the more abstract theoretical discussions favored by Posner, 
Polinsky, Cooter and Ulen and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Malloy. 
Trying to harness casebook pedagogy to teach law and economics, 
however, raises serious problems. Economic analysis is a mode of de-
ductive reasoning closely akin to that employed in the "hard" sciences 
such as physics and chemistry. One does not begin with the "real 
world" in its full complexity, but instead with a simplified model based 
upon severely limiting assumptions. Within this framework of as-
sumptions, the analyst attempts to derive the consequences of the in-
teraction of a well-defined group of economic actors, each having a 
certain structure of preferences and subject to particular behavioral, 
governmental, and resource constraints. The explanations and predic-
tions derived from the idealized model are then compared with empiri-
cal data. The model's assumptions and postulated relationships are 
modified to result in explanations and predictions that better fit the 
data. The conclusions derived from the improved model are then 
compared with further empirical data in an unending iterative process. 
Analytical approaches to knowledge such as microeconomics are 
difficult to master. They are usually taught to students through the 
use of texts and other materials that systematically and incrementally 
develop a structure of assumptions and postulated relationships in an 
abstract, theoretical fashion. The texts then illustrate the resulting 
models' operation by applying them first to carefully constructed and 
highly simplified hypothetical circumstances and then to more com-
plex and realistic situations. Each of the four law-and-economics texts 
discussed above largely follows this conventional, proven approach to 
enabling students to develop a facility in applying deductive theory. 
Conventional first-year law teaching, in sharp contrast, generally 
in economics in his first chapter, see POLINSKY, supra note 6, at 2-4, Cooter and Ulen devote 
their second chapter to a comprehensive review of microeconomics, see COOTER & ULEN, supra 
note 7, at 15-54, and Malloy discusses "Basic Economics for Law and Economics" in his second 
chapter. See MALLOY, supra note 8, at 14-45. 
23. Pp. 277-310. Neither Polinsky nor Malloy discusses the common Jaw efficiency hypothe-
sis. Both Posner.and Cooter and Ulen present some discussion of this hypothesis, see POSNER, 
supra note 5, ch. 8; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, ch. 10, but they do not give it anywhere near 
the emphasis Barnes and Stout do. 
24. Pp. 409-529. Neither Polinsky, Cooter and Ulen, nor Malloy addresses constitutional 
law issues or applies public choice analysis. Posner does discuss constitutional questions in sev-
eral chapters, see POSNER, supra note 5, chs. 23-28, but makes only incidental use of public 
choice analysis. 
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begins by presenting actual cases in their full factual complexity and 
then inductively abstracts from those cases the general principles un-
derlying judicial decisions. Upper-level law students are thus by train-
ing - and probably by natural inclination as well, given their self-
selection for legal careers - more comfortable with the inductive case 
law approach to learning than with the study of formal theoretical 
models that dominates most other areas of graduate education. It is 
unclear, however, whether an elaborate body of abstract theory such 
as microeconomics can be effectively communicated through judicial 
opinions articulated in "legal" rather than "economic" language and 
embodying organizing conceptual structures (such as, for example, 
·~ustice," "statutory authority," and "stare decisis") that differ 
sharply from the core theoretical categories of microeconomics and 
price theory (such as, for example, "efficiency," "transaction costs," 
and "elasticity"). While there may be an economic logic implicit in 
many or most common law decisions - a matter of some controversy 
among scholars25 - such economic reasoning where present is usually 
veiled beneath a thick layer of doctrinal elaboration of legal concepts 
and is visible only to the discerning eye of the trained specialist. 
Barnes and Stout are no doubt correct that "[a] case orientation 
should appeal to those eager to escape the artificial assumptions asso-
ciated with economics .... " (p. vi). Nevertheless, microeconomic the-
ory in its essence is nothing more than an attempt to provide a view of 
the world through a lens of "artificial assumptions" carefully chosen 
to focus attention on features particularly significant for understand-
ing resource allocations. Students who wish to "escape" this analyti-
cal framework should first be encouraged to learn more about its 
structure, logic, and power, and then to subject it to a critical exami-
nation from various ethical perspectives and in light of important equi-
table considerations not fully captured by the framework. 
While I fully endorse Barnes and Stout's desire to provide a "vehi-
cle for appreciating and critically examining, rather than merely pro-
moting, the economic analysis of law" (p. vii) - all of my own law-
and-economics scholarship has similarly been critical rather than pro-
motional26 - Barnes and Stout have put the cart before the horse with 
their casebook format. This is the major shortcoming of Cases and 
Materials. The first order of business for a comprehensive law-and-
25. See, e.g., Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, The Efficiency of the Common Law 
Reconsidered, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 157 (1991); Richard A. Posner, A Reply to Some 
Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the Common Law, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775 (1981); 
George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 
(1977). 
26. See, e.g., Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating "Undue Hardship" Claims 
Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. 1 (1990); Gregory S. Crespi, If Pigs 
That Could Fly Could Reply: A Response to Daniel Posin, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 75 (1991); Crespi, 
supra note 18. 
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economics course text is to assist students in developing a solid under-
standing of basic and intermediate-level microeconomics; this should 
be done in as clear and explicit a fashion as possible, tailored to the 
background of the target students. This task requires a format of theo-
retical discussions, graphical demonstrations, and carefully framed hy-
potheticals, not a series of judicial opinions that at most implicitly 
reflect economic factors and rationales. Judges are not economists, by 
and large, and their decisions generally do not present and apply eco-
nomic principles in a fashion that highlights their economic rationales 
and consequences. Only after a text has properly developed the theo-
retical foundations of economic analysis should it examine the applica-
tion of economic principles in judicial or administrative decisions. 
Judicial opinions are inadequate vehicles for teaching economic 
analysis. Barnes and Stout attempt to deal with this problem without 
abandoning the casebook format by truncating most of the cases 
presented down to the barest excerpts - thus sparing students from 
having to read and reflect upon lengthy judicial discussion that is obvi-
ously irrelevant to the economic issues of interest - and then follow-
ing each of these snippets with an extensive series of notes in which the 
relevant economic concepts are defined, discussed, and applied to hy-
pothetical circumstances. The cases are in effect reduced to mere 
jumping-off points for the subsequent extensive case note discussions. 
In this limited role, the cases are more distracting than helpful; they 
still serve poorly to illuminate the economic concepts, and in their se-
verely excerpted form they lose the advantage of being able to convey 
the human dimensions of the underlying disputes more fully than can 
abstract theory. 
The case note discussions in Cases and Materials are generally 
quite good, introducing a broad range of important microeconomic 
principles in a relatively concise and nontechnical fashion. Barnes and 
Stout write well, and they clearly know their topic. The book would 
have been much better had the authors taken the next logical step: 
eliminating most of the case excerpts altogether and reorienting the 
book around their theoretical discussions and hypothetical applica-
tions, which the case note format presents in an unnecessarily choppy 
and subordinated fashion. This, however, would have made the book 
just another theoretical law-and-economics treatise that would have 
had to compete directly for course adoption with the genre's formida-
ble established competitors such as Economic Analysis of Law and An 
Introduction to Law and Economics. Uniqueness is sometimes more 
effective than quality as a marketing tool, and the authors may have 
wisely decided that product differentiation is the better part of valor. 
To point out in more detail the inadequacies of Barnes and Stout's 
casebook approach, I will focus upon the materials presented in Chap-
ter One. The criticisms that I would offer of Chapters Two through 
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Seven would be quite similar.21 
The initial section of Chapter One is titled "Efficiency and Utility 
Maximization," a reasonable subject with which to commence a law-
and-economics text. The section begins rather oddly, however, with a 
one-and-a-half page excerpt from Cidis v. White, an obscure New 
York State trial court opinion holding that a nineteen-year-old minor 
could not disaffirm her contract to buy contact lenses from an optome-
trist because these lenses constituted "necessaries."28 After reading 
this excerpt, I failed to see any obvious connection to the concepts of 
economic efficiency and utility maximization. The Cidis excerpt is fol-
lowed by almost three pages of fine-print author notes (pp. 3-5). The 
first case note suggests that the parties are likely to enter into a con-
tract with the expectation of increasing their satisfaction, although 
they may not subjectively understand their actions to constitute "util-
ity maximizing" behavior. A true, though obvious, point, but what 
does the Cidis excerpt add to a bare statement of that proposition? 
The next six notes embark upon a readable if somewhat disjointed dis-
cussion of rational maximization under constraint, the concepts of op-
portunity cost and efficiency, the contours of the rationality 
assumption, the theory of revealed preferences, and the desirable effi-
ciency properties of voluntary transactions. This discussion is stimu-
lating but would be more helpful to students were it not forced into 
the Procrustean bed of fine-print case notes to Cidis. The fourth case 
note refers to the potential conflict between the goal of utility max-
imization and the availability of the minority defense to contract en-
forcement, a matter to which Cidis bears at least a tangential 
relation.29 This conflict, of course, reflects the much broader tension 
between efficiency and other social objectives, comprehensible to stu-
dents only after they understand both Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency. The discussion of this question at this early point in the text is 
premature. 
The next section of Chapter One - titled "Efficiency and Wealth 
Maximization" - similarly begins with a two-page excerpt from Ross 
v. Wilson, 30 a New York case holding that a school district lacked the 
authority to sell surplus real property to a church at a certain bid price 
when it had received a higher offer for the same property from another 
local organization. The opinion (or what small fraction of it is 
presented) is couched in terms of whether the school district possessed 
statutory authorization to avoid the otherwise applicable fiduciary 
27. But see infra note 33 (noting some positive aspects of these latter chapters not shared by 
Chapter One). 
28. 336 N.Y.S.2d 362, 363 (Dist. Ct. 1972). 
29. The Cidis court, however, makes no reference to this conflict. Furthermore, the Cidis 
court did not allow the minority defense except insofar as it reduced the adult's recovery to the 
fair value of the lenses. Cidis, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 363. 
30. 127 N.E.2d 697, 703-04 (N.Y. 1955). 
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duty to local taxpayers, thus enabling the school district to accept less 
than the highest offer for the property. The opinion fails to discuss 
economic efficiency, wealth maximization, welfare maximization, or 
any other economic concepts. The subsequent author notes launch 
into a discussion of the relative utility consequences of the property's 
going to either of the various bidders, the differences between wealth 
maximization and utility maximization, the problems of measuring 
utility, and so forth (pp. 8-11). All of this discussion is entirely appro-
priate for an introductory chapter intended to impart to students an 
understanding of the principles of utility maximization and wealth 
maximization, and the differences between them, but a standard statu-
tory interpretation opinion like Ross adds nothing to this discussion 
and serves only to distract the reader. 
The last two sections of Chapter One suffer from similar shortcom-
ings. The third section opens with a helpful general discussion of the 
Pareto-superiority and the Pareto-optimality criteria and closes with 
case notes that introduce the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and 
weigh its significance against broader equitable concerns (pp. 11-17). 
These discussions are unfortunately sandwiched around a short ex-
cerpt from United States v. Causby, 31 which does not further the anal-
ysis. The final section utilizes a Maryland marital property division 
opinion32 that focuses on a constitutional takings discussion of alterna-
tive fairness criteria and their efficiency properties (pp. 17-20). 
In short, students would have been better served had the authors 
dispensed with the lead cases altogether and defined and discussed the 
theoretical concepts in the sort of comprehensive and cohesive fashion 
that one expects to find in an intermediate microeconomics text, and 
does find to an extent in the books by Posner, Polinsky, and Cooter 
and Ulen. The cases are distracting, not helpful, 33 and the theoretical 
discussions are made less accessible by their relegation to the fine print 
and arbitrary structure of author notes. The problem, moreover, is 
31. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
32. Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 410 A.2d 1052 (Md. 1980). 
33. I must concede, however, that in a few instances the cases presented in Chapters Two 
through Seven illustrate the relevant economic principles with sufficient clarity to be useful peda-
gogical vehicles. I am thinking particularly of the classic Boomer-Spur-Carpenter trilogy of nui-
sance cases, presented in Chapter Two, and of the Transatlantic impossibility case and Hadley v. 
Baxendale, presented in Chapter Four. In addition, Chapters Two through Seven draw upon 
helpful noncase materials. They include, for example, short excerpts from a number of classic 
law-and-economics works, including, among others, JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TUL-
LOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
(1962); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Malamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972); R.H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI-
ENCE 1243 (1968); and George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient 
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). These excerpts, however, are unduly truncated - five pages 
from Buchanan and Tullock (pp. 492-97), four pages from Calabresi and Malamed (pp. 56-57, 
75-77), one page from Coase (p. 36), one page from Hardin (p. 28), and four pages from Priest 
(pp. 293-97) - and thus fail to communicate the relevant concepts to beginning students. 
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not one of poor case selection. While careful research might have un-
earthed marginally better judicial opinions than Cidis and Ross for 
teaching the fundamental concepts of microeconomics, even the most 
economically oriented opinions of law-and-economics stalwarts such 
as Judges Bork, Easterbrook, or Posner are likely to prove unsuitable. 
One would not attempt to learn law by analyzing the speeches given 
by economists to their peers at professional conventions; why should 
one expect official judicial pronouncements made to litigants and their 
attorneys to serve well as economics primers? 
The second major failing of Cases and Materials is its attempt to 
present the usual range of topics covered in a law-and-economics 
course to a target audience of students having no prior economics 
background without first making a serious effort to teach them basic 
microeconomics. This simply will not work. The economic analysis 
oflaw, even if conducted at a rather rudimentary level, requires a solid 
grasp of market theory and of its roots in consumer demand models 
and in the theory of the firm. It also requires a fair degree of under-
standing of more subtle concepts that students do not usually encoun-
ter in introductory microeconomics courses, such as consumer and 
producer surplus, Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the Coase The-
orem, transaction costs, risk aversion, externality analysis, general 
equilibrium theory, game theory, and the theory of the second best. 
Basic microeconomic principles alone warrant a full-semester under-
graduate course. It usually takes yet another semester for students to 
learn intermediate price theory well enough to work through even a 
few simple applications. There is no reason to expect a law student 
who has not taken microeconomics, and who probably has not had 
extensive exposure to any other formal body of abstract deductive the-
ory, to master those difficult concepts more quickly than do under-
graduates. Any cursory review of microeconomics will surely be 
wasted on complete beginners, who will not develop sufficient under-
standing from such a review to profit from exposure to applications. 
If one is teaching law and economics to law students with little or 
no prior economics background, all that one can reasonably hope to 
accomplish in a single semester is to provide them with a solid intro-
ductory microeconomics course flavored with basic normative criti-
ques of the efficiency criteria and a few applications to basic legal 
questions. Cases and Materials, because it slights the basic economic 
theory to focus upon legal applications, is unsuitable to serve as the 
text for such a course. Moreover, while an introductory course is just 
what law students without prior economics training need, law schools 
should not necessarily have to provide remedial education to compen-
sate for poor undergraduate course selection. Turning the law-and-
economics elective into essentially an undergraduate microeconomics 
course is unfair to those properly prepared students already familiar 
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with basic economics and ready to learn how to conduct relatively 
sophisticated and policy-relevant economic analyses of legal issues. 
A text designed to teach law and economics to law students with 
no prior economics background should include a comprehensive intro-
ductory chapter presenting the basic concepts of supply and demand 
and marginal analysis in both discursive and graphical form. Unlike 
each of the four previously discussed texts, however, Cases and Mater-
ials has no such introductory chapter. Could Barnes and Stout really 
believe that students not only can commence a law-and-economics 
course without any prior economics background, but also can effec-
tively complete the course without ever confronting and mastering the 
standard microeconomic apparatus of utility functions, firm cost 
curves, supply-and-demand models, and the like? Would that it were 
true! 
Once they reach the regulatory and antitrust issues presented in 
Chapter Six, the authors apparently recognize that virtually nothing 
can usefully be said about the economic aspects of these issues to 
someone who does not understand the workings of competitive mar-
kets. Accordingly, they insert approximately sixty pages of material 
covering basic supply and demand theory, marginal analysis, and pro-
ducer and consumer surplus concepts, complete with the standard ta-
bles and graphs, albeit in an awkward case law followed by case note 
format. This insertion was poorly positioned; whatever formal 
microeconomic theory the authors chose to include should have been 
placed toward the front rather than in the rear of Cases and Materials. 
Supply-and-demand models and other basic economic concepts and 
graphical tools are useful generally for analyzing a wide range of legal 
issues, not just questions of antitrust or regulatory policy. While 
Barnes and Stout note in their preface that Chapters Three through 
Seven "may be read in any order" (p. v) and that an instructor may 
wish to "assign Chapter 6 early on" (p. vi), this book would have been 
easier to use had the technical economics material been presented im-
mediately after Chapter One, before any of the substantive 
applications. 
I do not mean to appear unduly critical of Cases and Materials. 
Barnes and Stout merit considerable praise for their efforts. Their 
book represents an innovative attempt to confront the yet-unsolved 
problem of writing a broadly suitable law-and-economics text. The 
authors have boldly chosen to aim their work primarily at students 
with no prior economics background, to spare these students as much 
as possible from having to grapple with the complex formal apparatus 
of microeconomics, and to see how much mileage they can get out of a 
novel casebook approach. Within the severe constraints that these 
choices impose, their effort is quite respectable. Almost every impor-
tant concept of microeconomics makes its appearance somewhere in 
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the case notes, and the nontechnical explanations communicate the 
gist of those concepts with admirable clarity. The treatment of the 
common law efficiency hypothesis is much more complete than that in 
any of the major competitor texts. The emphasis placed upon ques-
tions of constitutional law and the insights of public choice scholars is 
innovative and effective. To its great credit, the book exhibits a more 
sustained awareness of the limitations of neoclassical price theory and 
the efficiency paradigm than do any of the alternatives here discussed 
(with the exception, of course, of Malloy's book, which discusses little 
else), and the authors repeatedly urge students to weigh efficiency con-
sequences against other equitable considerations. 
Barnes and Stout are entirely correct in their assertion that 
"[a]nalyzing reported decisions requires economics to come to grips 
with reality" (p. vi), and I agree that students should be encouraged to 
subject judicial opinions to economic scrutiny. To be able to do this 
effectively, however, students must first learn quite a bit of 
microeconomic theory. Studying case law is definitely not the best 
way to achieve this prerequisite understanding. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the prior attempts to produce an adequate text for a law-
and-economics course has proven entirely successful. Cases and 
Materials has now come up short as well. A persistent problem obvi-
ously exists, and it appears to be rooted in both psychological and 
institutional factors. 
Three of the four best law-and-economics texts that were available 
prior to Cases and Materials - the Posner, Polinsky, and Cooter and 
Ulen books - are seriously deficient because of the limited attention 
they devote to critiques of the efficiency paradigm. 34 These noted 
scholars would not consciously slant their work to favor a partisan 
ideological stance; this pattern of omission appears more likely to be 
grounded in convention and in the unconscious psychological 
processes of rationalization and justification. Perhaps one should not 
expect scholars who have devoted a substantial portion of their careers 
to mastering a complex analytical apparatus enthusiastically to em-
brace and trumpet critiques that call into serious question the validity 
of the entire enterprise. For all its failings as a core text, Cases and 
Materials shows significant movement toward a more forthright and 
sustained appreciation of the ideological biases inherent in price the-
ory and in the use of wealth-maximization criteria. Perhaps this book, 
along with the Malloy text and other recent innovative law-and-eco-
nomics monographs such as Jules Coleman's Markets, Morals and The 
34. See supra Part I. 
May 1993] Microeconomics Made (Too) Easy 1575 
Law 35 and Robert Ellickson's Order Without Law, 36 heralds the arri-
val of a new generation of law-and-economics scholars free of the un-
critical commitment to efficiency that characterizes much of the work 
of their predecessors. 
Even if this is so, another and perhaps more intractable problem 
blocks the emergence of an adequate law-and-economics text. The dif-
ficulty is the institutional structure within which law-and-economics 
courses are offered. Universities now provide these electives in two 
different settings. Economics departments offer a relatively small 
number of classes _as advanced seminars for their undergraduate and 
graduate majors. These students all have substantial and current eco-
nomics backgrounds but often have little or no prior exposure to legal 
questions. Law schools account for a much larger proportion of law-
and-economics classes. The students enrolling in these courses are al-
most exclusively upper-level law students, with economics back-
grounds that range from nonexistent to substantial. 
Without undue difficulty, a knowledgeable person could prepare a 
text well suited for teaching law and economics to economics majors 
and graduate students. A firm understanding of basic and intermedi-
ate-level microeconomics could be presumed, allowing the introduc-
tory technical material presented in such a text to focus directly upon 
the relevant intermediate-level concepts. The text would have to 
devote a substantial section to a comprehensive overview of the legal 
institutions and issues likely to be the primary focus of the course, 
such as, for example, the optimal structure of property entitlements, 
the proper nature of contract default rules, and the choice among dif-
ferent regimes of tort liability. The normative critiques presented in 
such a text could presuppose a working familiarity with the Pareto 
and Kaldor-Hicks criteria, and with welfare economics generally, and 
could thus focus upon the less familiar utilitarian and Kantian alterna-
tives to wealth-maximization criteria. Such a text need not differ radi-
cally from the existing Cooter and Ulen text, except for giving much 
greater play to the normative critique. 
An "economic" problem, however, stands in the way of the availa-
bility of such a text. A book so narrowly and precisely targeted, even 
if adopted by a large majority of those few economics departments 
now offering such a course, would likely sell only a few hundred copies 
per year, probably too few to justify its commercial publication and 
sale at standard textbook prices. 
The central problem facing the prospective writer of a law-and-
economics text for the substantially larger law school market is not 
one of too few students, but of having simultaneously to meet the 
needs of two very different student populations. Students with little or 
35. JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORAIS AND THE LAW (1988). 
36. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991). 
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no prior economics background need a microeconomics principles text 
modified to include substantial discussion and critique of the efficiency 
criteria, comprehensive explication of the Coase Theorem, and appli-
cations to basic legal questions. Students with strong economics back-
grounds, however, need only a summary review of basic 
microeconomics and are ready for a fairly rigorous discussion of inter-
mediate-level theory, formulation and in-depth analysis of alternative 
normative criteria, and sophisticated applications of economic princi-
ples to a wide range of legal issues. They are also ready to read judi-
cial opinions and search for hidden economic rationales. A book 
targeted exclusively at one of these groups will likely fail to be widely 
adopted because of teachers' concerns for the needs of the other group. 
A book that attempts simultaneously to meet the needs of both groups 
risks avoiding the Scylla of redundancy only to founder on the 
Charybdisian shoals of awkward compromise. Economic Analysis of 
Law, An Introduction to Law and Economics, Law and Economics, and 
now Cases and Materials all exhibit the latter difficulty. Law and Eco-
nomics: A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice does not, but 
Malloy did not seriously intend it to serve as a comprehensive core 
text and, as previously discussed, it has other problems if pressed into 
that role. 
The prospects for enhanced academic reputation and commercial 
gain would likely lead to the publication of suitable texts, at least for 
the law school-based courses, if a key institutional reform took place. 
Schools might move toward replacing the existing single-semester gen-
eral enrollment law-and-economics elective with a two-semester se-
quence: Law and Economics I for students with little or no prior 
economics background; Law and Economics II for students with 
strong economics backgrounds and those who have taken the first 
course. Such a sequence would segregate students into groups with 
consistent levels of initial economics expertise. To design appropriate 
texts for each course would then be far easier. Assuming that each of 
these two courses had sufficient aggregate enrollment nationwide to 
assure the commercial viability of a widely adopted text, which would 
appear likely if most or all law schools adopted this curriculum for-
mat, one or more suitable texts for each course would probably be-
come available. 
I am not, however, aware of any widespread movement toward 
offering students a broader menu of law-and-economics electives. To 
the contrary, the law-and-economics movement in law schools appears 
to have crested if not receded somewhat from its high point.37 Currie-
37. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A 
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 32 (1989) ("Compared to a 
decade ago, law and economics is less often seen as an intellectual tide with which every scholar 
must come to terms, but rather as a technical sideshow that a young law professor may now 
spurn with little professional peril."). 
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ular reform efforts in legal education now focus more upon enhancing 
student writing skills and practical lawyering abilities than on offering 
a broader selection of interdisciplinary electives.38 The awkward mix 
of students in law-and-economics courses will probably persist indefi-
nitely. Conscientious teachers will have to continue to muddle 
through without an adequate core text, laboriously cutting and pasting 
their homemade sets of course materials. No relief is in sight, and 
Cases and Materials unfortunately provides little help. 
38. For example, Southern Methodist University, where I teach, recently adopted a signifi-
cant curricular reform centered around the introduction of a first-year "Lawyering Process" 
course and expanded availability of upper-level elective seminars with stringent writing require-
ments. No expansion of the single-semester "Economic Analysis of Law" elective into a two-
semester sequence along the lines discussed in this review was seriously considered. 
